Washington and Lee University School of Law

Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons
Supreme Court Case Files

Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers

10-1975

Drew Municipal Separate School District v. Andrews
Lewis F. Powell Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/casefiles
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, and the
Education Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Drew Municipal Separate School District v. Andrews. Supreme Court Case Files Collection. Box 31. Powell
Papers. Lewis F. Powell Jr. Archives, Washington & Lee University School of Law, Virginia.

This Manuscript Collection is brought to you for free and open access by the Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers at
Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Supreme
Court Case Files by an authorized administrator of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

~~~~ ~ ) ~

~ ~ ~ 4P . ,~·~~L..JUJ(

(•

~~.-v ~
~
~ ~--() ~~ ·~

~r~~~ c.~.

CH s-

¥!<-¥.....J__

(

_

PRELIMINARY MEMO

J +~

J)mvvvUJ
·if, ~DREW MUNICIP A L SE P ARATE
. . . . AA

U

~ ~CfLNilJil(~~>
,d-M~ ,

SCHOOL DISTRICT

~ - ~ -+II

C

CA 5
ert to ·

.

v.

1.

SUMMARY:
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...;,., Timely

li~ r''s

rule again:

In an attack by resps, two black fe m al e

equal prOtection test (an irrational classification); (b) due process (an

irrebutable presumption of immorality); and (c) strict eqnal protection (a snsp e ct ~
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aides, the DC (N.D. Miss., Keady, C. J.) found the rule void under (a ) the
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CA 5 affirmed on the first two, not reaching (c).
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FACTS:

In spring oL 1972, school. superintendent ·Pettey (a petr),

distnrbed by knowledge that some teacher aides were parents of illegitimate children,
promulgated nnwritten instrn-ctions to Mrs·. . McCorkle, administrator in: charge of the
teacher aide pr-ogram, that parentage of an- illegitimate child ·wo,,ld henceforth

L/
disqualify instrnctionai

personnel~ .

inc,,mbent or.· applicant;.. from employment.

The

School Board,. •Tnaware of the r.11re nntiL snit wa·s filed; later . ratified it ' an ct the actions
taken against resps.

Resps Rogers and:Andrews were both 11nmarrie:d mothers of an

illegitimate child.. Rogers, . an. ihC11mbent· in·

'71--72~

was not ·.rehir_ed;:. Andrews, an

applicant after the rnie' s pr.omnlgation-, . wa·s not ·hired.ior :the .Jan.- '73· .semester.
Both were otherwise gnalified.;: as to each; . the action.s were c-based -sol-eJ:y' on the rnle.
Three rationales were offered· below, . throngp: which :the r•rle was said to
advance the perrn..is sible end· or fostering;, a: pr.oper:-moral :clifnate .in

p~tr'

s schools:

(:E.) St•liC_h parenthood is prima· facie_proof'oLimmorality; (ZL st,ch parents present

impro•per role models for. stndi:mts; and· (31 their:·employment_Tnaterially contribntes to
the problem of scJiooigirL pregnancies-. . Tiie ·- rrc- rnled ·the .Erst invalid as a classifying
mechanism,. since teachers- with present·. and ' demonstrable .good moral chciracter are
antcnmaticaiiy inchded an the. basi's of a . past; . irr:evocable -,event; . whereas those \\·hose
present illicit s-exna.I behavior.. might render them nnfit were :exclnde·d from the class
if no child res,Tlted or if an_abortion· were pr.oc11 red . . Similarly; nnder dne- proceE s,

Nb

the rule was· void for estabri's:hing an arbitrary -and ·irrebnttable presnm:ption of bad

]/
Testifying, Pettey- eraborated. on the scope . of the n :rle,.: stating tl'I<it it wo,ld
s·ecr·e taries, . librarians·, . cafeteria .workers;- . vobi.nteers-, ~ and PTA
presidents,. bnt probably not. bns drivers -, . janitors, . and maids,,
inc]~Tde~ ~··

J

- -----

-

- -3 ·. _ -

moral character from the proven fact of illegitih1.ate parenta g e.

CA 5 a dopted t he

DC's rea s oning, citing Cleveland Bd. of Ed,c. v . .LaFlenr, 414 U.S. 6 3 2 (1 9 74 ).
CA. 5, , noting that a state statute was available to remove or suspend te ac hers f or

*

immoral conduct, after a p:ublic hearing, also held that to deny those a ff ecte d b y
petr' s rule the benefit of that

--

.

t}

is. itself to violate equal prot e c t ion.
....._,-

_._....._

,

As to (2) and (3) above, the DC; noting that the conflicting expe rt testi mo n y
was of a "judgmental .nature" unsupported by solid fac.tnal basis, found the lik elihoc

oi. inferred learning by_ sttJdents from . such a teacher /parent "highly imp roba b l e ".
Fu·rther, . there wa·s -no e:vidence .that .r esps pnblicized their statns or prosely ti ze d a
i:ts. desirability.

(CA 8

19TI ~), .

CA .5: ag_reed, . distinguishing McConnell v. Anders on, 4 51 F. 2d 19

where university regents .- declined to hire a teacher not becanse he wa

hon1.osexoal- b1Jt becanse. of.his .' activis.t ·role in .advocating s a me, snch t h at to have h
him· wm,la · have indiCated tacit approval by the nniv.ersity.

Examining (3) a b o\·e,

GA. 5. f.cmnd· no factnaLs11pport in the record • . CA. 5 ·d id. not reach the DC' s fin d i ng t h
the. r.nle . a s.: applied created a · snspect ·sex classifiC:atiorr, as to which no co m pe ll ing
s:ta:te. ihte.res.t had been shown ..

3.:..

GD.N TENT IONS=

*

(a:.) · Petr contends that resps t claim fails iLthey have no constitntional righ t /..

he.a:r illegitimate children, s ·ince they otherwise have no claim to continned e mp l o ymentnnder.. Bd. of Re g ents v. Roth; 408

u·.·s.- 564

{l972l:

Resps assert t h at t h e

interest. at. stake is withiri the . 14th A .. ~ s protection of. ' 1 libe rty"; and th a t t h e rul e
impinges on .the fundamental right to bear children . . Fu-rther, apart fro m any H th
A. . right, . tho. e.gual .p-rntection· clause is -a .barrier again·s t irrational cla ss if ic a ti o n s .

<"' ..... r~,

- -4
(b) P e tr argues that the rule was adopted not on the basis that such p a rent 's a r
presently immoral b\1t on the reasonable edncational gronnd that they are impro pe r
models for the roles occ11pied by the teacher, i.e., "edncator, adviser, friend, an d ,
at times, parent-snbstitnte . .'' Goss v.- Lopez, 419 U". S.- 565; 594 (1975) (Pov;ell, J.,
dissenting).

The expert testimony ignored by the lower courts supports the pro p o siti <

that students d·o find out about teachers' private lives and that inierred 1Ja rnin g fr om
tea~her'

s status as parent· of an illegitimate .child can and does oc·cur.

To bar th o se

adults of that status is thus rationally related to the .permis·sible ed\1cational end of
fm.stering proper societaL models.

Resps state that by eschewing _rationales ( l) and

((3) above, petr is in effect r .eargning .the evidence, .since all three were fonnd (fro m
Pettey's testimony) to be the . asserted bases for the .rl.Tle, .and
<CA 5.

all

were advanced b e f or

In any case, . resps align themselves with CA 5.:

(c) Petr c.ontends that . hypothetical applications of the rnle· to third parties,
e. g. , birth incident to rape, . cited by the .lower . conrts as. exemplary- of arbitrarine ss ,
shonld not be considered.

Under

U~S. _v.

Raines, 362

U~'S.:

17_"(19.60), resps, '\vho

v0Iuntarily engaged in illicit conduct, cannot be heard to raise possible
applications of the rule.

uncon s titu ti on ~

No· specific . answer by resps,. although LaFleur is cited

throughout.
4.

DISCUSSION:

Petr' s Regents argurrent is inapposite·, this plainly not be in g

a cr:ase of procedurar protections attendant ·to the loss of a state-c-reated right, but in
the first instance a straightforward equal protection claim.

Neither: the benefit d e n ie c

nmr the burden i:mposed by ·the classification need implicate. a .specific . constitutio n al
:rright in order to trigger traditional eqnal 'protection

_,

I

analysis~ :

.

- - 5-

As to the ''in'1proper model" rationale, the lower conrts conch1sio n th a t i t ,,·a
a.n irrational basis for the rule remains open for question:

a school board might we l

reasonably find that the presence of. a teacher, . known by impressionable stndents t o
sncch a parent, does impart a degree of cnltnral learning and perhaps tacit appro ,·a l
the '''authority" represented by the school .itself. . Tending to erode the judgment of
reasonableness, however·, is Pettey's testimonythat he wonldincl.J,de,
workers within the rnle.

~.__g_:__,

ca f et e r

That stndents might look to them as role models seems

highly qnestionable.. I. view rationality nnder . traditional eqnal protection as a close
G'nestion.

LaFle,H' s reasoning wonld initially appear ,,navailable here nnder \Vein be r g:e
v. Salfi, No. 74-214 (J,me 26), . which seems to reserve "ir:reb11ttable. presnmption "

analysis for those cases where the statnte "constitnte[s]
exe:.cise Of •· •• •• JYI.Otected' f:reedoms,

II

a hea·vy bJrden

on the

namely, . 11 freedOll'1 Of personal Choice in

matters of marriage and family life [aslone . of the liberties protected by the . .
Fourteenth Amendment•. "

Slip Op~ . at . 19~ . qnoting from LaFlenr,- 414

u: S. at 639 - 6-l

The crucial issue,. then, under Salfi 1 s interpretation of LaFleur (and St a nley .......

l!llinois, 405 U .. S .. 645 (1972)) is whether. resps have a ·protected freedom to bear, b)
design or inadvertence, a child out of ·wedlock, . exercising that ·"choice" in lieu of
CID>ntraception a:r: abortion . . The general power of .the .States over matters of mor a l s
specifically to pr-ohibit fornication, . militates against protected sta-tus ·; the ong oi ng
emergence of alternative life styles · -- - open rnarriage, no 1narriage, . or even c:1il cl raising by- single persons 405

U~S ..

points in the opposite direction;

See E1sens taclt ....... B a

438,. 453-45'4 (1972).

This· seems to be. a s-olid candidate for : ce rt; .
There is a
1 l I!.I I 75

response.. .
Mason

DC '1>:. CA 5 op s
petn ·

Court
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Voted on .................. , 19 .. .

Argued ................... , 19 .. .

Assigned .......... . ....... , 19 . . .

Submitted ................ , 19 . . .
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List 3, She~e~tu3---Joint Motion to Dispense
with Printing the Appendix

Noe 74-1318

DREW MUNI CIPAL
S~PARATE SC HOO L DIST .

13>v-t
..L

Jl

•

c1\e ed

<3\~ '\V..~ ' ~
\1\iJ ~ ~ IVv\ ~

see

..

~~cJ ~~ GV'\)
~\A..- ~
-- :J

~.

ANDREWS

6# the Court granted cert to CA 5 in this case to consider

\\CQ~'s

\€'()w.\ r\"1 ~ t he c onstituti o nality of petr 1 s rule against employing parents of illegitimate

~~ · uJ\"\\ ~
children.

~~~
~e ~ ~e o~

The parti e s now move to dispense,.;.ith the !,.:._quirem.!nt of an appendix

~~ ·and to proce e d on the
........

,-,

original record.
au:

J?Sac

~

See Rule 36(8).

The parties note that

the record in thi s c ase c onsists of 1 1 128 pages and that "[a]fter conferences
with attorneys fo r all parties, it appears that the entire record would have to
be p r inted as the s ingle Appendix. "

They approximate that the cost of printing

the entire record would be $5, 500.

Of this amount, about half would have to be

- 2 -

advanced by resps, 'a-pparently because petr does not-tonsider that parts
designated by resps are necessary.
a re paupers.

See Rule 36(3).

(They have not filed a motion to proceed IFP.) Petr states that

~

i t i s a small rural school district with a limited budget.
c ase proc e eded in CA 5 on the original record.

They note that the

Both parties urge that they

w ould incur great financial hardship if required to bear the cost of printing the
Appendix .
Should the Court deny their motion1 the parties seek additional time in
which to designate and cross-designate the portions of the record to be printed.
DISCUSSION:
l ately.

Se e , e. g.

1

For some reason, the Court has had a rash of these motions

motions in American Motorists Ins. Co.

v. Starnes, No. 74-

1481, List 1, Sheet 4, this Conference and TSC Industries vg Northway, Inc.

1

No. 74-1471, List 3, Sheet 3, this Conference.
The parties appear to be misconstruing the purpose of the Courtts Rule.
Basically, a printed appendix is for the convenience of the members of the Court
i n studying the case.

(It also helps in storing, filing, binding, etc.) Rule 36(1)

r equires that the appendix contain (1) relevant docket entries; (2) relevant pleadings,
f indings, opinions, etc.,; (3) the judgment, order or decision in question; and
(4)

11 any

other parts of the record to which the parties wish to direct the Court 1 s

particular attention.

11

(emphasis added)

The Rule also provides the mechanisms

for designation and cross-designation and specifically adrr10nishes:
In designating parts of the record
for inclusion in the appendix, the parties
shall have regard for the fact that the record
on file with the clerk is always available to
the court for reference and examination ahd
shall not engage in unnecessary designation. 11
Rule 36 (2 ).
11

- 3 As pointed out by Me'"s'srso Boskey and Gressman, by-{his provision the Court
had hoped that the printed appendix would be kept to a minimum.

Boskey and

Gressman, The 1967 Changes in the Supreme Court 1 s RulesJ> 42 F.R.D. 139, 151.
The authors warned, however :
It may be inevitable that the natural tendency
of lawyers is to seek to protect their clients 1
interests by printing more than is necessary,
simply out of an abundance of caution. But if
the bar discerns the Court 1 s purpose from the
clear statement in the 196 7 rules., there is
ground for hoping that the appendix system
will result in substantially fewer pages of the
certified record being printed. 11 Ibid.
~I:?

The members of the bar obviously have not

"

11

discerned 11 the Court 1 s purpose.

If there is nothing in the record which the parties wish to direct the

Court 1 s particular attention, then they should say so and state as their ground
for dispensing with a printed appendix that the judgment and opinion below are
already printed in the petition, as is the case.

This is the ground on which

the' Court traditionally has granted such motions.

To assert that the parties

can only agree that the appendix should contain the entire record and, therefore,
that the appendix should be dispensed with because of costs is somewhat of a
nonsequitor.

And, in any event, high printing costs are one way of encouraging

compliance with the spirit of Rule 36.
As to the parties alternative motion for an extension of time in which
to file an appendix, this w0uld appear to fall within the province of the Clerk.
See Rule 36(a).
This 1s a joint
11/5/75
PJN
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January 9~ 1976 Conference
List 7, Sheet 2
No. 74-1318

Motion of Re sps to Proceed
Further Herein IFP.

DREW MUNICIPAL
SEPARATE SCHOOL DIST.

v.
ANDREWS
On October 6, the Court granted cert to CA 5 in this case to consider the
constitutionality of petr 1 s policy barring employment of unwed parents of illegitimate children as teachers and teachers aides.
Resps now seek leave to proceed IFP.

They both attach affidavits that

their respective incomes are $675.00 and $400.00 per month.

They fear the

potential assessment of the approximately $3, 500 cost of preparing petr 1 s brief
and appendix, which figure represents 43% and 73% respectively, of their annual
salaries.

Resps ask that they be relieved of the potential obligation of paying

any fees and costs, and that the United States pay the costs of printing their briefs.

--

......._

- 2 -

See Rule 53(7).
CA

11

They state that they were granted leave to proceed IFP in the

for purposes of appealing on the record below.
DISCUSSION: Resps not only fail to

.

de~ide

11

the $3,500 figure between

them, but err in believing that they are potentially liable for the cost of printing
petr 1 s brief.

The only costs taxable are those of printing the record and the

appendix and the Clerk's $100 fee for filing..

The awarding of costs is also a

discretionary matter and, if the judgment below is reversed, the Court may
decide not to award costs.
It is not clear what re sps mean when they state they were allowed to
proceed in forma pauperis

11

for purposes of appealing on the record below.

11

Apparently, they did not proceed IFF in the trial court.
As to the

11

printing 11 of their brief, resps may not be aware of the relaxed

standards set forth in Snider v. All State Administrators, 414 UQ S. 685 (1974).
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TO:

Justice Powell

FROM:

Carl R. Schenker

No. 74-1318

DATE:

January 23, 1976

Drew Municipal Separate School Dist. v. Andrews

I recommend that this case be dismissed as
improvidently granted.

If the merits must be reached I

recommend affirmance.
1.

Prelude.

I consider the constitutional questions

lurking around this case to be very difficult.

Leaving aside

the possible differential impact on women and blacks of the Pettey
Rule, the case poses serious questions about the scope of the
right to privacy and the legitimacy of the State's
proselytizing for traditional moral values.
I doubt that a statute making it a crime to conceive
a child out of wedlock would be constitutional.

But

different questions are posed by the power of the state

.

r-

~
~A

to require that those in the especially sensitive job of
''?

·~tedching not lend credence to anti-establishment views on
-

~

o

1

•

~~~,.._

matters of morals.

?

(In this respect compare the inability of

the State to prosecute possession of obscenity within the
home (Stanley v. Georgia) to the ability of the state to
restrict commercial dissemination of

obscenity(~.~.,

Miller).)

2.

If an appropriately narrow state policy were pursued to
prevent school teachers from encouraging anti-establishment
moral behavior, I think it might well be constitutional.

......

We have here, however, no such appropriately narrow state
policy.

Here a yahoo promulgated a ridiculously overinclusive

~

rule just because he didn't like having unwed parents around the
school.

I think the Court should be wary about getting

dragged into such a case.
2.

Improvident Grant.

If you have not read the

amicus brief by the National Education Assn, I suggest that
you consult its Part II.

There the NEA points out that

there is no need for this Court to reach the constitutional
questions posed in this case because of the recent promulgation
of Title IX regulations.

It appears that Drew is a recipient of

federal educational funds (see note 12 of the NEA brief).

Under

the Title IX regulations sex-discrLminatory employment practices
cannot be followed at such schools unless they are shown to be
demonstrably job related.

These regulations were not in force

when this case was decided below.

But in the future a rule

such as this - which the record establishes will be enforced
primarily against women - must measure up to the requirements of
Title IX.

Since such regulations must meet statutory

restrictions in the future, there is no need for this Court

3.

to consider the constitutional difficulties.
Given the promulgation of the Title IX regulations
and the tough constitutional questions involved here, I think
the Court should dismiss the case as improvidently
3.

The merits.

granted.~

The principal question on the

merits is whether this rule is sufficiently related to promotion
of a legitimate state interest.

I presume for present purposes

that the promotion of traditional moral values is a legitimate
state interest at least in this context.

Therefore an

appropriately related state policy could be follow e d with
regard to the employment of unwed parents.

But it must be

recognized that such a policy does impinge on sex-related
areas of privacy.

This Court has recognized (1) that policies

affecting sexual privacy generally must have a significant
justification (Roe v. Wade; LaFleur) and (2) that such privacy
rights inhere in the unmarried as well as the married.
(See Doe v. Bolton; Eisenstadt v. Baird.)

As a result, the

Pettey Rule should require rather impressive justification.
That justification ha s not been forthcoming here,
where it is sheer presumption that the children are at all aware
of the unmarried status of the teachers.

I am not sure at

present what ki nd of rule I would find sufficiently related to the
state pur pose.

Perhaps a hearing would be required in this

j

•

4.
context before employment could be denied.

(Cf. LaFleur.)

In any event, there seems to be so little reason behind this
particular rule that it should be found to be a violation
of either due process or equal protection.

Carl

________, ____
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3-5-76
To:

LFP

From:
Re:

A.

CRS
Drew Municipal School Dist. v. Andrews, No. 74-1318

Improvident Grant.
District Court decision--July 1973

CAS decision--Feb. 1975
Promulgation of Title

IX-~egs--July

1975

Grant--October 1975
This case thus meets your criteria for an improvident grant:

There

has been a significant intervening event between the lower court

----

-

decisions and the grant.

-

-

That event was not reflected in the

certiorari papers.
B.

Merits.
I will not burden you with a lengthy memo this morning

(and hopefully never).
1.

RMX~('~Policy"v.

Rule

You asked whether any difference would be made if we treated
this case as simply several instances of refusals to hire, rather
than as a state rule (since it has never been very formalized).
I believe this distinction would have only one relevance
that would not make much difference in this case.

As a general

matter I think there is no requirement that state laws be written,
so we should be hesitant to say this was not a law in any event.
But even if we reached that conclusion, «aRKkiax constitutional
guarantees do not turn on the existence of a law.

The administrative

application of a neutral state law can arise to an equal protection
violation.

(In the famous Yick Wo case a facially neutral licensing

statute was used to discriminate against Chinese by the administrators.)

Similarly, an administrative

~KX

policy that was

discriminatory in its application would violate equal protection
even if there was no formalized state law that appeared neutral
on its face.

Thus, for example, if a KI« law school run by the

state merely has vague and unspecified admissions criteria but
used them so as to exclude all MIXK black applicants, there would
be an equal protection violation.

(This is DeFunis in reverse.)

To summarize, three kinds of state behavior can rise to equal
protection violations:
(a)

a rule of law--whether formal or informal, written or oral

(b)

the KM discriminatory application of an apparently
neutral rule of law (Yick Wo)

(c)

the discriminatory
system (~eFunis)

~IXKX

admin5tration of a discretionary

As far as applying this scheme to this case, I come up with
the following;

(Remember that this goes only to an analytical

framework, not to the merits)
or a (c) situation.

This case presents either an (a)

That is, we either have Pettey's Rule as a rule

of law or we have Pettey applying vague criteria for teacher
hiring in such XK a way as to discriminate (though perhaps permissibly) against the parents of illegitimates.
In all

K~

likelihood, however, we do not have a (b) situation.

That is, assuming that Pettey's Rule is a rule of law, there has
been no real proof of its discriminatory application.
this

X~

tends to take

claims out of the case.

t~e

In my mind

sex discrimination and race discrimination

XX Such claims would be stronger if over

a long period of time only black females were discharged under this
rule, especially if it could be proved that whites and/or men were
not moved against.

It may be that the record supports some

sexual discrimination claim insofar as there was testimony from
the administrators that thef had not really investigated men.
2.

KM Analysis on the merits.

Here I adhere basically to what I said in my first KM memo.
Pettey's

Ru~e

zeros in on the parents

MXXItXK~XKtMMKMK

of illegitimate

The cases in this Court give considerable substance to the notion
that procreation is a liberty interest that deserves protection
whether one is single or married.
wold;

Skinner; LaFleur.)

(Roe;

Doe;

Eisenstadt;

Gris-

When such an interest is impacted upon

by Kk a law, the state should be required to give substantial
justification.

Perhaps the best analysis of this problem

~

would be to require that school boards can act against the parents
of illegitimates only if they advocate unwed parenthood or
undeniably communicate it to the children (e.g, by being pregnant
during the school year).
I might add that on the K merits, this can be analyzed KKXKXKkKX
KK~XIX~MKKKXIMKXK

more easily as a due process case in the
(unless we get into sex discrim.)
Roe-Doe sense than as an equal protection case/ But the gen~ralized
XKKM remarks about whether the Pettey Rule is a rule of law, etc.,
would apply in that context as well as in the context of equal
protection analysis.
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1.

Constitutional guarantees apply outside the realm of formally

written statutes.
(a)

There can be informal, written rules of law.
;Even
(b) Eexa if there is nothing that can be characterized as

a

ru~e

of law on its face, a pattern or practice of administrative

behavior can operate de facto XXX as a rule of law.
Here it is admitted that there is either a rule of law
or a practice that focuses on the parents of illegitimates.
that focus must be justified.

~XM~MXKIIJ

Thus

But there is

no admission of a focus on women or blacks, so that practice need
not be justified.

(Some record of uneven application of the rule

to women or blacks HMHXMM could be made over time however. (Yick Wo.)
2.

Due Process.

The best way to KKI analyze this case is as a

liberty interest in

~

pr?creation.

The state has a HX valid

interest also. [I think that the state's interest should not overbear the parents unless the parents advocates unwed parenthood in
the classroom or is demonstrably

~~K~

pregnant.

Perhaps in a

small town like Drew the schoolboard could prove children know
about their

~XK~KKM

teachers private XH lives, but that shouldn't

be presumed.]
3.

Equal protection.
(a)

This is probably not an equal protection case unless

we focus on the fact that the rule will usually X get only women,
and not men.

There may be enough proof in the record to support

a Yick Wo ruling on this point.
(b)

This is not an Eisenstadt case. There there was a discrimina

tion between married and unmarried people.

But the discrimination

was not relevant to the state purpose of preventing use of contraceptives. The discrimination here is relevant to the legitimate
purpose or promoting morality.
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CHAMBER S O F

JUSTICE POTTER STEWAR T

March 8, 1976

Re: No. 74-1318, Drew Municipal Separate School
District v. Andrews
Dear Chief,
My preference in this case would be a one line
order without elaboration: The writ is dismissed as
improvidently granted.
Sincerely yours,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

-~~

.

~upum.t

QJ{l"lttf of tqc 'J!lniic?t ~taicg

~aalyin.gLrn. ~. ~· 211-?JL-.;l
CHAMBERS OF

/

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

March 8, 197 6

Re:

74-1318 - Drew Municipal Separate School District v. Andrews

MBMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

At Conference it was the consensus that I would
send a memorandum calling for a DIG and await reaction.
Some who were for DIG conditioned it on there being
no writing.
My sheet shows:
3 to affirm with DIG as alternative
4 to reverse with DIG as possible alternative of
2 of the 4
2 DIG
When the dust settles or one week passes, I will
reassess. It may develop that a memorandum will help
11
settle the dust. 11
Regards,

March 9, 1976

'II'·

1_1:;.,

~t""

:.r prefer a

any opinion.
I'
~"

',.. :

'!;
~~· J;
!"

cc:

dismissal as improvidently granted, without
J.

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR.

March 9, 1976

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

RE:

No. 74-1318 Drew Municipal Separate School District
v. Andrews

f== wuald joi rr Po MCI
01 d ~ 1· ~;

s

suggesbon for a One line

t nout el a:borati QR,..

W.J.B. Jr.

I

~

'f e.· ~

)

-

.§uvumt ~11u.rt of tqr 'Jlniil'b .§tatc.s
'Jl!aslrington. p. QJ. 2 DpJ!-~

CHAMBERS OF

March 10, 197 6

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re: No. 74-1318 --Drew Municipal Separate School
District v. Andrews

Dear Chief:
I go for a one-liner in this one.
Sincerely,

7/ft1.
T. M.
The Chief Justice
cc: The Conference

q .
\~
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?

j;uvutttt Qj:cmt ttf tltt ~ttb- j;udtg
~rurlrittghm. !fl.
CHAM BE R S

Qj:.

2.0~Jl. ~

0~

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL S TEVEN S

March 17, 1976

Re:

No. 74-1318 - Drew Municipal Separate
School District v. Andrews

Dear Chief:
Unless someone writes something that requires
a response, I will join a simple dismissal as
improvidently granted.

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

I

TO: Mr. Justice Brennan

Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
· Mr.

Juctice
Just1ce
Ju;Jtico
Justice
Justice
Justice
Justice

Ste~ar t

White
l''1..r.Jlnl l
Blu;'Jlcnn

Powsll
R""hnquis t
Stevens

From: The Chief Justice
Circulated:

APR 2 1 1g76

Recirculated: _ _ _ _ __

1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 74-1318
Drew Municipal Separate
School District et al.,
On Writ of Certiorari to the
Petitioners,
United States Court of Apv.
peals for the Fifth Circuit.
Katie Mae Andrews et al.
[April -, 1976]
PER CuRIAM.

The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently
granted.

approve of your Per
'~>

r,

J. •

*·'

'•t-, . '.:-,

...

.§ltpt".rntt ~ttttd ttf

±:qt ~nittb' ~tattG

1tJas-4inghm. "lfi. <!J. 211~'1-~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

)

April 21, 1976

Re: No. 74-1318, Drew Municipal Separate School
District v. Andrews
Dear Chief,
I agree with the proposed order in this case.
Sincerely yours,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

·r

<!fcnrt xrf tqr ~~ .§hrlrs
'Dasfri:ngton. ~. <!f. 2llc?'*~

.§u:prtmr

•

C H AMBERS OF

.JUSTICE WM . .J. BR E NNAN, .JR .

April 22, 1976

RE: No. 74-1318

Drew Municipal Separate School District
v. Andrews et al.

Dear Chief:

Please join me.

Sincerely,

1

t/

The Chief Justice
cc: The Conference

~~.

. 15zv~ r

~ttJlUtttt

<!Jcu.d cf tqt ~b ~taUs
1naaJrittgbm.lB. QJ. 20.?"1.~

CHAMBERS OF

April 22, 1976

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re:

No. 74-1318 -- Drew Municipal Separate School
District v. Katie Mae Andrews

Dear Chief:
I agree with your Per Curiam in this case.

Sincerely,

.ftr
T.M.
The Chief Justice
cc: The Conference

·',

'

'

.§u:prtntt Q}ltttrl ttf tJrt ~ftb ~taftg

. .a-ll'.qittghm. ~. <!}. 2.lT.?'l-~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

/
April 22, 1976

Re:

No. 74-1318 - Drew Municipal Separate School
District v. Katie Mae Andrews

Dear Chief:
Please join me.
Respectfully,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

~tt lr.tlltt (qMu1

(rf Ut.c 'ntdtc~h-uc~
~'rnslrngfon. l{l. <.q. 20gTJt,.;l

CHAMl1Ef ~S

Of"

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMU N

April 2 6, 1 9 7 6

Re : No . 74 - 1318-

Dr ewMunidpa1SeparateS chool
Di strict v. Andrews

- -··------·-·-------·-- -- ·- ------· - --

D ea r Chief :
I am content to dismiss the writ in this case as irnprovidently granted . I there fore j oin the per curiam you circulated on
April 21.
Sincerely ,

The Chief Justice

cc : The Conference

~'

..

(Blip Opinion)
NOTICE: This opinion Is subject to formal revision before pubilcatlon
In the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the
United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other
formal errors, In order that corrections may be made before the preilminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 74-1318
Drew Municipal Separate
School District et al., On Writ of Certiorari to the
Petitioners,
United States Court of Apv.
peals for the Fifth Circuit.
Katie Mae Andrews et al.
[May 3, 1976]
PER CuRIAM.

The writ of certiorari
granted.

IS

dismissed as improvidently

' '
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